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ABSTRACT
Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmful
for job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodox
reforms of the labor market have proved di±cult to implement because of
political opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why we ob-
serve such regulations. In this paper I outline a theory of how they may arise
and why they ¯t together. This theory is fully developed in a forthcoming
book (Saint-Paul (2000)), to which the reader is referred for further details.
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11 Introduction
In several economies the functioning of the labor market is altered by a set
of institutions that restrict the ability of private parties to freely set quan-
tities and prices, along with a tax system that a®ects the value of working
and of not working, often at the expense of the former. Key examples in-
clude employment protection legislation, which restrict the ¯rm's ability to
reduce their workforce; minimum wages that put a °oor on the remunera-
tion of labor; collective bargaining agreements that impose a rigid pay scale
across skills, often compressing the distribution of wages; work rules that
make it easier for incumbent employees to achieve higher wages and/or lower
working hours; unemployment bene¯ts that increase the reservation wage
of incumbent employees; active labor market policies where the government
directly acts as a substitute for private agents in search and recruiting, etc.
Furthermore, many labor market institutions come together, so that we are
witnessing the co-existence of competing social models for organizing the
labor market.
Standard economic analysis holds that such institutions are harmful for
job creation and typically increase unemployment. This is why they are often
called "rigid", a term that we shall use to refer to any regulation that re-
duces job creation. Most orthodox recipes against structural unemployment
involve a reduction or elimination of such arrangements. But, if they hurt
everybody, they would not be observed in practice. Indeed, many orthodox
reforms of the labor market have proved di±cult to implement because of the
reluctance of politicians or else because they faced ¯erce opposition by large
or powerful sectors of society. Opposition is made worse by the recognition
that the orthodox recipes ultimately call into question the social model as
a whole, implying that unemployment can be cured only at the cost of a
radical change.
2For these reasons it is important to explain why we observe such regula-
tions. In this paper I outline a theory of how they may arise and why they ¯t
together. This theory is fully developed in a forthcoming book (Saint-Paul
(2000)), to which the reader is referred for further details.
2 The role of rents
The theory is articulated around several central concepts, the most important
one being that of a rent. By rent we refer to the di®erence between the welfare
of an employed worker and that of an unemployed one, or, more precisely, by
the di®erence between what an employed worker can get from his employment
relationship and his outside option, i.e. what his welfare would be outside
that relationship.
The rent is one of the most appropriate measures of imperfect competition
in the labor market. It tells us how far wages are from market clearing, or
equivalently how remote the unemployed are from underbidding the employed
successfully. As long as the rent is positive, involuntary unemployment must
arise, because in a perfectly competitive labor market any worker looking
for a job could ¯nd one instantaneously. In that case the welfare of the
unemployed would be equal to that of the employed, and there would not be
a rent.
Rents arise for two sets of reasons. First, they may arise because of mi-
croeconomic frictions that prevent wages from fully adjusting downwards in
situations of involuntary unemployment. Such frictions include imperfect ob-
servability of e®ort at the ¯rm level; turnover costs and speci¯c investment in
the employment relationship, that create a situation of bilateral monopoly,
allowing workers to extract part of the surplus generated by their job; costly
search and recruiting, which is a special case of speci¯c investment; impossi-
bility of writing a complete contingent wage contract, etc. Second, there exist
labor market institutions whose e®ect is precisely to give rise to such rents.
They often do so by magnifying the microeconomic frictions; for example a
3hiring restriction would increase the cost of replacing a worker by another
one, thus making him more speci¯c and increasing his ability to extract part
of the surplus.
Why should we expect some economies to have a greater rent, hence to be
more "rigid", than others? First of all, there may be genuine di®erences in
the severity of microeconomic frictions. For example, if workers are less likely
to move it may be more costly for a ¯rm to locate an appropriate worker,
which in turn will increase the amount of resources spent on recruiting and
therefore the surplus appropriable by the worker. Second, the rent may be
high because society chooses a set of labor market institutions that generate
a high rent. In such a case, the high rent arises as the outcome of political
decisions. For this to be the case, it must be that those who bene¯t from
the rent are numerous and/or powerful enough. This brings the following
question: how does the rent a®ect the welfare of various workers?
The two main variables that determine a worker's welfare are wages and
the fraction of time he expects to spend in unemployment. That fraction
is smaller for the currently employed than for the currently unemployed. It
depends on the two key transition rates that characterize the state of the
labor market. These are the job loss rate, which we also call exposure, and
the job ¯nding rate, also called labor market tightness. When the rent in-
creases, each individual worker asks for a higher wage. This reduces ¯rm's
incentives to hire. In general equilibrium, wages must be brought in line
with productivity, which means that they cannot increase by the full amount
of the rent. In order to bring wages down, the outside option, or alterna-
tive wage, must fall, meaning that the unemployed are necessarily worse-o®.
Consequently, the unemployed will always be against an increase in the rent.
In fact, we are able to show a more general result implying that under cer-
tain conditions the unemployed will generally favor free markets and oppose
government interventions in the labor market.
Therefore, the support for rents must come from a subset of employed
workers. Because the rent reduces employment, it typically reduces the job
4¯nding rate and may also increase the job loss rate. This e®ect harms em-
ployed workers, so that if some of them gain it must be that they have
greater wages. Hence we conclude that labor market institutions are sup-
ported by a group of employed workers because it allows them to increase
their wages. This is exactly as if these workers were organized in a labor
union that achieved monopoly power on labor supply and set wages above
market clearing in the pursuit of its members' self-interest. Here, instead,
workers vote for an economy-wide institution which alters the environment in
which wages are set, in such a way that they expect wages to actually rise in
equilibrium by enough to make them better-o®. We refer to that mechanism
as the political insider mechanism.1 Workers may be unable to coordinate in
order to form a labor union, but by voting in favour of an institution that
raises rents they are able to collectively achieve a higher wage level exactly
as if they were organized in a union. Labor market rigidities allow insid-
ers to monopolize the market at the economywide level even though their
bargaining power may be quite reduced at the ¯rm level.
Just as in the case of a labor union, there must exist a favorable enough
trade-o® between wages and employment for the political insider mechanism
to give rise to enough support for the rent-raising institution. Under constant
returns to scale to labor, such a trade-o® does not exist as equilibrium wages
are pinned down by the marginal product of labor, which is constant. In
such a case there is no support for the rent. This suggests that there must
be decreasing returns to labor in order for the mechanism to be e®ective|
then, a reduction in employment will be associated with a rise in worker's
marginal product and therefore wages.
3 Labor rigidities and distributive con°ict
Under what circumstances are there decreasing returns to labor at the ag-
gregate level? Economic theory teaches us that there must be some ¯xed
1This refers to the work of Lindbeck and Snower (1988), who have studied how microe-
conomic frictions increase incumbent employee's bargaining power.
5factor whose quantity does not adjust when the labor input changes. Other-
wise the standard argument that one could replicate the existing production
structure would automatically lead to the presumption of constant returns
to scale. If there exists such ¯xed factors, then by reducing the amount of
complementary input, wage increases redistribute from such ¯xed factor to
labor, while at the same time reducing the return to the ¯xed factor. Hence,
labor market institutions are a device to redistribute income between factors
of production.
It is tempting to think that this ¯xed factor is capital; one would then
be talking about the traditional "class struggle" between labor and capital,
and labor market institutions would be one weapon that labor could use,
in a democracy, to resolve that con°ict in its favor. However, the main
characteristic of capital is that it is not ¯xed, but accumulable. Any change
that reduces its remuneration, such as a decline in the complementary labor
input, induces a fall in investment and a subsequent reduction in the capital
stock, up to the point where the return to capital is restored to its desired
level.2Conversely, wages must have fallen back to their equilibrium level.
In other words, when one takes into account the adjustment of the capital
stock, in the long run everything is as if there were constant returns to labor
as capital adjusts one for one to changes in employment, thus leaving wages
and rates of return una®ected.
For this reason we believe that the most relevant con°ict that lies at
the root of labor market rigidities in modern societies is that between more
and less skilled workers. Any observer of European labor markets in the
last thirty years of the twenty century would agree that it is a good stylized
description of these markets to think of the labor market for high skill work-
2This is true in a variety of growth models. If there is perfect international capital
mobility the rate of return, in the long run, cannot be di®erent from the world rate of
return, adjusted for country-speci¯c factors representing risk, etc. In closed economy
models such as the Ramsey model, the rate of return to capital cannot be di®erent from
the rate of time preference of consumers. In the Solow model, the national savings rate
pins down the capital/output ratio in the long run, and thus wages. See Blanchard and
Fischer (1989) and Romer (1995) for a discussion of growth models.
6ers as in equilibrium, with wages that adjust to o®set demand and supply
imbalances, while the low skilled labor market is in disequilibrium, with in-
voluntary unemployment and sticky real wages. We will henceforth assume
that the labor force can be partitioned in two groups, that we will label for
simplicity skilled and unskilled, although by unskilled we mean a wider group
than is usually referred to, i.e. the bulk of low and medium skilled workers
who are most a®ected by minimum wages, employment protection and col-
lective agreements.3 Labor market rigidities impose binding constraints on
unskilled labor but not on skilled labor, whose market remains in equilib-
rium, so that employment of skilled labor remains essentially unchanged in
response to a fall in unskilled employment.4 It is therefore reasonable to
treat skilled labor as a ¯xed factor.5 Consequently, labor market rigidities
mostly redistribute between skilled and unskilled labor.
The above discussion suggests that the political support for labor market
rigidities would come from unskilled workers|and not all of them, only those
who are employed. Unemployed unskilled workers and skilled workers lose
from them and thus oppose it.
If this was the end of the story, societies were labor rigidities are observed
would be very con°ictive. Even though the group we labelled unskilled may
be numerous or powerful enough to impose the institutions that suits them,
we should observe constant political activity of the skilled group against
such institutions. This does not sound quite realistic, and we believe that it
3At the bottom there may exist a "secondary sector" of the labor market, which may
be able to escape such regulations. Workers in this sector are essentially paid their outside
option and for our purposes should be lumped with the unemployed.
4This obviously depends on the supply elasticity which it is reasonable to consider as
small.
5It is quite interesting to study why the argument made about the adjustment of capital
does not carry to the case of skilled labor. Obviously, its supply is not nearly as elastic,
in the long run, as that of capital. But let us abstract from that. Consider a rise in the
wages of unskilled labor, which triggers a fall in unskilled employment. Clearly, the skilled
wage falls. But, at the same time, the job prospects of a worker who would enter the labor
market as unskilled also fall because of the rise in unskilled unemployment. Consequently,
the returns to skill need not fall, they may even rise. See Saint-Paul (1994,1996) and
Cahuc and Michel (1996).
7is because of the cohesion e®ects that labor market rigidities exert upon the
employed workforce.
Such cohesion e®ects exist because even absent rigidities redistributive
con°ict would arise between skilled and unskilled workers. To the extent that
the latter are poorer than the former, they have an incentive to expropriate
them, i.e. to vote for any institution that results in a transfer being made
to the unskilled by the skilled. They would indeed be able to impose such
a transfer if they are more numerous, or more politically powerful, than the
skilled|i.e., more generally, if the decisive voter is poorer than the mean.
Labor market institutions is another way to achieve such redistribution,
and to a well trained economist it is a far fetched and ine±cient way of
redistributing income, since it forces part of the workforce to be idle and
excludes the poorest, i.e. the unemployed, from that redistribution. But
the key point is that rigidity is supported by a very di®erent coalition than
¯scal redistribution. By increasing the wage income of unskilled workers,
rigidity reduces the gap between them and the skilled, thus lowering their
incentives to expropriate them. As a result, part of the skilled will also
support rigidity, because they recognize that less rigid institutions would
intensify the redistributive con°ict between skilled and unskilled workers.
That is, rigidity reduces their wages but also reduces the transfer that the
unskilled extract from them, and if the latter e®ect is stronger than the
former, they will indeed support the rigid institution.
One can show6 that if we consider an economy with a large number of
worker types, rather than just two types, the preceding argument carries
through, in the sense that rigidity will typically be supported by a "middle
class" of employed workers with intermediate skill levels. It will be opposed
by the unemployed, who are the great losers, by the most skilled, who would
gain most from an increase in the employment of complementary labor inputs,
and would thus prefer to have greater wages even though they would pay more
taxes, and by the poorest workers, whose wage income is so low that they
6See Saint-Paul (2000), Ch.3.
8would be better-o® with greater transfers.
Therefore, while rigidity, just as ¯scal transfers, redistributes from skilled
to unskilled workers, relative to ¯scal transfers they actually increase the
cohesion of the middle class. The losers from rigidity|the unemployed and
the two extremes of the distribution of income| are likely to be less powerful
politically than the losers from redistribution. For this reason we expect
rigidity to arise even though it is an ine±cient way to solve the distributive
con°ict between skilled and unskilled workers.
In some sense, cohesion among those who keep their jobs is increased be-
cause the poorest are excluded from the redistributive game. This alleviates
the redistributive con°ict, because those who remain in that game are made
more homogenous. At the same time the total amount of resources that can
be shared among the "ins"|the employed|is larger because those who have
been excluded are precisely those who contributed less to the total surplus.
Here we clearly see that there are two redistributive con°icts going on. One
is between the skilled and the unskilled workers; we call it internal con°ict.
The other is between the unemployed and the employed; we call it external
con°ict. A key insight is that external con°ict is more likely to arise, the
more intense the internal con°ict, i.e. the greater inequality among employed
workers. If all workers had the same marginal product, they would all con-
tribute the same to total output, and excluding some of them would not
a®ect output per capita for those who remain. By contrast, when inequality
is greater, the poorest contribute much less to total output than the richest,
and excluding the former substantially increases what can be redistributed
to each remaining worker.
4 Which economic environments favour rents?
Whether we expect rents to arise as a stable political equilibrium depends on
three underlying parameters that characterize the functioning of the labor
market.
9Exposure tells us how often workers expect to lose their jobs. It depends
on technology, which determines the frequency at which ¯rms want to destroy
jobs, on people's preferences and other sociological factors, which determine
how often they may want to quit their jobs, and on institutional factors such
as home ownership or other labor regulations such as employment protection.
The lower exposure, the more the employed expect to keep their job for a
long time. Exposure enters as the weight of the unemployed's welfare in
the employed's welfare. When it is lower, this weight is lower because the
event of becoming unemployment is more remote and thus more heavily
discounted. Therefore, when exposure is lower, the employed care less about
harming the unemployed and are more likely to support high rents, or more
generally institutions that reduce the job ¯nding rate. This result tells us
that we expect rent-creating institutions to prevail in societies which, for
other reasons, have low labor turnover and low mobility.
Elasticity, which we de¯ne as the elasticity of labor demand for unskilled
labor, tells us how big the scope for wage increases is when employment of
unskilled workers is reduced. It is the standard parameter than intervenes in
any analysis of a union's preferred wage or more generally of any monopo-
listic price-setting behaviour. The greater that elasticity, the less wages rise
when employment of unskilled workers increase, and the lower the political
support for employee rents. Elasticity is intimately linked to the degree of
complementarity between skilled and unskilled workers. It is smaller, the
more the two are complements in production. This tells us that rigidity is
good at redistributing between groups of people who cooperate strongly in
the market.
Inequality, i.e. the gap between the skilled and unskilled productivities,
determines the intensity of internal con°ict. As we have argued it is because
of that internal con°ict that it pays to the middle class coalition to opt for
rigid labor market institutions. Therefore we expect that the support for
rents will be greater, the greater inequality. This is actually true over some
range, if inequality is low enough. But past a certain threshold inequality
10reduces the support for rents, because at high inequality levels the cost of
rigidity in terms of job loss is too big.
5 Employment protection and unemployment
bene¯ts
The existence of rents acts as a catalyst for other labor market rigidities,
because they increase the employed's support for such rigidities. The clearest
example is that of employment protection legislation. When rents exist,
losing one's job is associated with a welfare loss, precisely equal to the total
rent. The employed therefore have an incentive to reduce the likelihood
of job loss by means of an employment protection legislation that prevents
¯rms from freely reducing their workforce in a downturn. That incentive is
greater, the greater the rent, i.e. the less competitive the labor market. In
a perfectly competitive labor market the rent would be equal to zero and
being unemployed would be equivalent to being employed because anyone
could ¯nd a job instantaneously at the going wage. Thus there would be no
support for employment protection.
Therefore, rigidities that create rents are likely to lead to other rigidities
that protect rents, which further deteriorates the competitive performance
of the labor market. Furthermore, it is also true that employment protection
itself increases the political support for high rents. This is because employ-
ment protection reduces exposure to unemployment, and that the employed's
most desired rent is greater, as we have seen, the less exposed they are.
The causality therefore goes both ways; rent-creating and rent-protecting
institutions reinforce each other. We say that there is a politico-economic
complementarity between the two because if one is around, the support for
the other is greater. Politico-economic complementarities explain why labor
market institutions come together, i.e. why we observe competing consistent
social models rather than menus of institutions that span the whole space of
possibilities.
11While complementarities are successful at explaining why rigid wages co-
exist with employment protection, it is harder to understand why generous
unemployment bene¯ts are also typically part of the picture. That is, the
case in favor of politico-economic complementarities between rents and un-
employment bene¯ts is much weaker than for employment protection. At
face value, one would be tempted to claim that in the absence of rents, there
is no involuntary unemployment, and thus no need for workers to insure
themselves against the unemployment risk. Closer examination, however,
suggests that this is a fallacy. For when unemployment is very low, so is
the ¯nancial cost of bene¯ts, so that insurance is cheaper even though it is
less desired. Indeed, if workers were voting under a veil of ignorance| i.e.
not taking into account whether they are initially employed or unemployed
but instead assigning an objective probability to each event based on the
actual unemployment rate|they would elect full insurance regardless of the
unemployment rate.
If unemployment bene¯ts are merely set to provide insurance against job
loss, it is essentially incorrect to treat them as a "rigidity" in the same way as
minimum wages or employment protection. True, they increase unemploy-
ment, as these other institutions. But while "rigidities" typically bene¯t the
employed at the expense of the unemployed, unemployment bene¯ts obvi-
ously redistribute in the other direction. While the political system is likely
to deliver, as we show, too much of these other rigidities relative to the social
planner's optimum, it is likely to deliver too little unemployment insurance.
While a reduction in exposure increases the support for rents, it reduces the
employed's most preferred unemployment bene¯t level, since they care less
about becoming unemployed. Finally, the ¯nancial burden of bene¯ts reduces
the scope for complementarities with other institutions: if unemployment is
greater say because minimum wages are higher, the tax cost of bene¯ts is
larger which reduces the employed's support for unemployment insurance.
Things are di®erent, however, if unemployment bene¯ts are used by in-
cumbent employees to achieve higher wages in equilibrium. They do so be-
12cause they increase the worker's outside option in the wage formation process.
They will be used as an instrument to achieve higher wages if other institu-
tions cannot be perfectly manipulated in order to target the employed's most
preferred wage level, say if there exists some ceiling on minimum wages or
on the degree of wage compression that collective agreements may specify,
or some constitutional limits on work rules that can be imposed on em-
ployers. In such a case the logic of the political insider mechanism applies
to unemployment bene¯ts as well, and they vary in a similar way as other
rigidities. The unemployed will then want less insurance (at the margin)
than the employed; the political system will deliver too generous bene¯ts rel-
ative to the social optimum; and lower exposure will increase the employed's
most desired bene¯t level. Furthermore, it may well be that bene¯ts are
more e±cient at boosting wages when the rent is higher, which may generate
a politico-economic complementarity between unemployment insurance and
other institutions that allow insiders to achieve greater wages.
6 The viability of labor market reform
If, in a given country, the underlying economic conditions are such that a set
of "rigid" institutions is a political equilibrium, it is foolish for an economist
or an international body to recommend that they make their labor market
more "°exible".7 For a government who would attempt such a reform would
by de¯nition face political opposition, and would be forced to withdraw his
reform to maintain itself in power. Even if the reform was made politically
viable by some clever design to compensate losers, the resulting situation
would be unstable and people would soon vote for a return to the previous
arrangement. The reform would only have brought turbulence and policy
uncertainty, which as such may eliminate any of its positive employment
7Unless, obviously, the political support for rigidity arises from ignorance about its
adverse economic e®ects. In that case, however, policy recommendations are not really
more needed: dissemination of economic theory and evidence should be enough.
13e®ects.8
On the other hand, it may be that changes in underlying parameters
makes society less willing to keep its rigid institutions. This would happen,
for example, if faster technological change increased exposure; if biases in
that change increased inequality in the zone where it reduces the support
for rigidity; if greater international capital mobility increased elasticity; or
if some innovation increased substitutability between unskilled workers and
some other factor, perhaps capital, again increasing elasticity. In such a case
the support for rigidity would automatically be reduced, not least because it
is more costly in terms of jobs.9If the change is strong enough then society
would eventually shift from rigid to °exible institutions, even absent any
recommendation by economists.
The problem of reform, however, becomes more interesting if several sta-
ble outcomes may coexist. For example, underlying parameters may change
in such a way that an economy which is originally °exible would not want
to become rigid, but that if the economy is originally rigid it will remain so,
despite the fact that the support for the status-quo is lower than absent the
change in underlying parameters. That is, the support for rigidity is greater
if it is originally the status-quo than if it is not, i.e. there is status-quo bias.
Status quo bias implies that while the economy is in a stable political
equilibrium, if reform was imposed on it by a dictator it would end up in
another situation that would also be stable, i.e. once the dictator is gone
there will not be su±cient political support to revert to the old ways. The
problem of reform becomes meaningful if there is status quo bias because
the economy may be locked into an "undesirable" situation (from the view
point of some social welfare measure that di®ers from the decisive voter's
objective) and could be led, by some properly designed reform, to a more
desirable, equally stable, equilibrium. Status quo bias also implies that in-
8For a convincing example, see Bertola and Ichino (1996).
9See Krugman, 1995, for an argument that skilled-biased technical change has increased
unemployment in Europe in the 1970's because relative wages have failed to adjust, al-
though Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux (1997) ¯nd a much more mixed picture.
14stitutions are persistent, and that di®erent social models may be observed
across two economies with similar underlying characteristics because one of
them experienced some speci¯c shocks in the past, which led to institutions
that survived into the present even though the shock has ¯nally died out.10
Complementarities are likely to increase the status-quo bias, particularly if a
comprehensive reform of the labor market cannot be written on the political
agenda.
Status quo arises when a given set of institutions typically create their
own constituency. The existence of high rents is a powerful source of status
quo bias. Any reform implies some labor reallocation, and those who expect
to lose their jobs are likely to oppose the reform. Clearly, the greater the rent,
the more these people expect to lose, and the greater their opposition to the
reform. When rents are large, institutions may create their own constituency
by maintaining a fraction of the workforce in activities that exist precisely
because of that institution. This is what we call the constituency e®ect.
The strength of the status quo bias generated by the constituency e®ect
is greater, as we saw, the greater the rent (absent rents job loss does not
make the worker unhappy); it is also greater, the lower the political weight
of the unemployed. The unemployed are those whose job ¯nding prospects
are improved by change, so they provide a counterweight to the constituency
of job losers; the lower their political power, the smaller that counterweight.
Finally, the constituency e®ect generates a stronger status quo bias, the
more sluggish the job creation process, because those who expect to ¯nd
jobs because of the reform again provide less of a counterweight to those
who expect to lose their jobs.
The constituency e®ect is particularly prominent when one considers in-
stitutions such as employment protection. Employment protection prevents
¯rms from getting rid of their workers when hit by a shock that should make
them obsolete. Consequently, there exists a mass of workers whose jobs would
10In Saint-Paul (1997), I speculated that the tight labor markets that Europe experi-
enced in the post-war period eventually allowed insiders to get high rents, which eventually
let to a set of rigid institutions that persisted beyond the period of tight labor markets.
15be instantaneously destroyed if that regulation were slashed, who provide a
powerful constituency in favor of the status quo. Clearly, these workers would
not exist if the economy did not have employment protection, for any job
which becomes obsolete would then be instantaneously destroyed.
Worker's uncertainty about whether they will end up in the pool of losers
or gainers from the reform is also likely to strengthen the status quo bias by
virtue of a mechanism which we call the identi¯ability e®ect. By de¯nition,
people know for sure their situation under the status quo, but may be un-
certain about where they will end up after a reform. If the decisive voter is
employed, then an increase in uncertainty typically increases his likelihood
to end up unemployed as the outcome of the reform, which, as long as rents
are positive, reduces his support for the reform. If the losers from the reform
were perfectly identi¯ed, to the extent that they are a minority the decisive
voter would typically expect to keep his job, and would support the reform.
It is because it redistributes losses from nondecisive to decisive voters that
uncertainty increases status quo bias. In a world where the decisive voter
is employed and where losers are job losers, this condition is likely to be
satis¯ed.
How can reform, other than implemented by a dictator, overcome the
status quo bias and lift the economy from an undesirable, stable political
equilibrium to a more desirable one? This is a complex topic and much
research remains to be done. Let us insist on two general principles.
First, reform should be designed so as to redistribute gains from nonde-
cisive to decisive voters. For example, reform can be made viable by means
of a two-tier system that preserves the privileges of the originally employed
workers while the new legislation applies only to future hires11. It is shown
that the ¯nancial burden of such reform falls upon the ¯rms that employ
the incumbent workers. Firms have zero political weight in our analysis, so
that the reform design clearly redistributes gains from nondecisive agents to
decisive ones. If these ¯rms could vote, they would not accept the reform.
11See Saint-Paul (2000), Chapter 8.
16Another example is that of a reform which speci¯es that the redundancies
that take place during a certain period around the date of the legislative
change should proceed according to some ranking of employees by senior-
ity. Such a clause would overcome the identi¯ability e®ect by granting the
decisive employed voter that he will not lose his job because of the reform.
Second, one can take advantage of initial conditions such that the sup-
port for the status quo is small. For example, in the case of employment
protection, an economic boom reduces the share of old, obsolete jobs in total
employment, and therefore the constituency against reform. Or, the support
for reduction in wages may be greater at the start of a recession when the
employed are more exposed to unemployment.
7 Conclusion
The preceding discussion sheds light on why we observe rigities in Europe
and not in the U.S. This is due to the fact that the underlying parameters
characterizing the functioning of the economy generate much less political
support for rent-generating institutions in the U.S. than in Europe. In the
United States, higher employment turnover increases the extent to which the
employed internalize the unemployed's welfare in their decisions; political
insider mechanisms are less favourable because greater capital mobility and
sharper product market competition make labor demand inelastic; ¯nally,
the greater inequality of skills makes rigidity more costly in terms of jobs.
Finally, in Europe the bottom of the distribution of income is traditionally
better represented by political parties (such as the Communist Party) than
in the U.S., where its participation in elections is quite low. This makes
redistributive pressure lower in the U.S. than in Europe; therefore, the gains
from rigidity that are associated with cohesion are greater in Europe than in
the U.S.
These di®erent outcomes are reinforced by the complementarities across
institutions, which lead to the emergence of a "European model" distinct in
17several respects from the American model. Furthermore, the existence of em-
ployee rents create a severe status quo bias in Europe, via the constituency
and identi¯ability e®ects. This explains why despite the convergence in un-
derlying economic conditions that has taken place between Europe and the
U.S. in the last decade, under the pressure of greater international economic
integration and faster °ows of goods, people and information, attempts to
reform the labor market on this side of the Atlantic have generally faced
¯erce opposition from organized interest.
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